Please see http://bugtracker.ispconfig.org/index.php?do=details&task_id=3707 found a bit of a flaw with howe app details are stored
The APS packages from apsstandard.org require it to store the passwords in plaintext. So what you describe here is a known limitation when you use the aps installer and not a security vulnerability. If you want to ensure that there are no cleartext passwords of the APS installer in your database, then you have to disable the aps installer for your clients as there is no way to store the passwords as md5 or crypt like we do for all other passwords because the aps installer requires it that ispconfig passes the passwords in plaintext to it at install and update.
I've implemented a partial workaround now, which removes the passwords after installation of the APS package, so passwords are in the db just for a limited timespan. The drawback is that updates for APS packages cant be implemented in the installer now.
Would it not work if he password was passed to the installer as plain text the. stored in some encrypted way but before being passed back to the aps installer decrypted so it sees it as plain text? Sort of a little custom script infront of he installer scripts?
This would be just cosmetical or "fake security" as the admin would be able to decrypt and see it in the same way that he can see it now. So there is no way to hide the password for the admin if the password must be available in plaintext again at a later timepoint as the admin will be able to use the same procedure for decrypting that the script uses.
