ISPConfig Authenticated Remote Code Execution (CVE-2013-3629)

Metasploit has released a vulnerability notice for the ISPConfig project:

http://packetstormse...e/CVE-2013-3629

Short Description

A correctly authenticated ISPconfig server administrator is able to upload language files into ISPConfig on his own server which potentially may contain malicious php code.

Questions and answers

Q: Can someone attack my server trough this exploit remotely?
A: No.

Q: Is this a privilege escalation issue?
A: No.

Q: Can a client or reseller attack my server trough this vulnerability?
A: No.

Q: Is a fix available for this Issue?
A: Yes, a fix is available since september 4th
http://www.ispconfig...ig/patches.html
The patch ID is: 3053_langimport

Q: How can my server be affected by this vulnerability?
A: The only way to misuse this potential vulnerability on an unpatched
server is that the server administrator downloads a language file
from an untrusted source and then uploads this language file into
ISPConfig on his own server after he authenticated himself correctly
as server administrator. So the risk that someone is affected by
this issue at all is very low.

Q: How did you fix it?
A: We implemented a stricter parser for the language files to avoid
that language files with malicious code get written to disk when
uploaded by the administrator. Additionally we added a warning text
to remind the administrator to not upload files from untrusted
sources to his server.

Q: What about the article at PCWorld and the blog from Metasploit?
A: Metasploit and PCWorld published a misleading article about this
potential vulnerability in ISPConfig and some other OS projects
were they claim that we haven't and even won't patch this issue while
the issue is indeed patched since Sept 4th.
We informed metasploit about that on Sept 4th. This can be verified
by everyone in our svn log:

Revision 4144 from our SVN stable branch:
svn://svn.ispconfig.org/ispconfig3/branches/ispconfig-3.0.5

The patch was also published on the ISPConfig patch page the same
day. The disclosure was sent to us encrpyted with our pgp key and
also our contact information is linked on every page on the
ispconfig.org website, so the information that we can not be reached
or that the disclosure could not be sent to us securely as stated by
PCWorld is just wrong.